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I. INTRODUCTION
Roscoe Pound was one of the true giants of twentieth-century
American law, and it was an honor of the first magnitude for one of us
to give the Roscoe Pound lecture.  Pound’s contributions to the law are
well documented and well known.1  It is less well known that he cov-
ered the first Nebraska football team for the student newspaper, that
he was the very first in the long line of fanatical Nebraska fans, and
that he wrote cheers and victory songs.2  He wrote some of them in
Latin, which would be a challenge for twenty-first century fans at Ne-
braska or elsewhere.
II. FREE EXERCISE IN THE AGE OF SMITH
Our topic, in the lecture and in this Article, is the free exercise of
religion.  Free exercise is as fundamental as any other First Amend-
ment right, yet it has become controversial.  Few Americans would ad-
mit to opposing religious liberty, but many Americans seek to
minimize it.  Academics question whether religious liberty has any
1. See, e.g., ROSCOE POUND, JURISPRUDENCE (1959); ROSCOE POUND, SOCIAL CONTROL
THROUGH LAW (1942); ROSCOE POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA IN AMERICAN LAW
(1938); ROSCOE POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW (1921); Roscoe Pound,
The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, 24 HARV. L. REV. 591
(1911); Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Adminis-
tration of Justice, 29 A.B.A. REP., pt. I, at 395 (1906), https://law.unl.edu/Roscoe
Pound.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/T5CB-KBQP]; see generally FRANKLYN C. SE-
TARO, BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE WRITINGS OF ROSCOE POUND (1942) (collecting the
writings of Roscoe Pound).  For a recent full-scale review and evaluation, see
David M. Rabban, Pound’s Sociological Jurisprudence: European Roots and
American Applications, in LE “MOMENT 1900”: CRITIQUE SOCIALE ET CRITIQUE
SOCIOLOGIQUE DU DROIT EN EUROPE ET AUX E´TATS-UNIS 113 (Olivier Jouanjan &
E´lisabeth Zoller, eds. 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2688094 [https://
perma.unl.edu/YU36-P2KJ].
2. Husker Century, Roscoe Pound, Nebraska’s First Fanatic, NET NEBRASKA https://
web.archive.org/web/20101125142522/http://netnebraska.org/extras/husker_cen
tury/hc_mvp/hc_fans/hc_fans2.html [https://perma.unl.edu/4LB4-6SDN].
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modern rationale,3 and many Americans affirmatively oppose relig-
ious liberty whenever it conflicts with some other interest they care
about more.  One of us has addressed this resistance to religious lib-
erty elsewhere;4 here, it merely sets the frame for our topic.
Opponents of religious liberty take much comfort from the Su-
preme Court’s 1990 decision in Employment Division v. Smith.5  This
decision came down before much of the recent opposition to free exer-
cise emerged; it was mostly the work of conservatives concerned about
what they viewed as judicial activism.  The state in Smith penalized
the use of peyote in the central ritual of a Native American worship
service.  Under existing law at the time, the state had to show that
this burden on a religious practice was necessary to serve a compelling
government interest.6  But Smith held that government has no duty to
justify burdens on religion if the burden is inflicted by a law that is
“neutral” and “generally applicable.”7 Smith held that banning a wor-
ship service raises no issue under the Free Exercise Clause if the ban
is imposed through a neutral and generally applicable law.
Four dissenters, the religious liberty community, the larger civil
liberties community, and Congress all reacted with alarm.  Congress
and thirty-three states have rejected the Smith standard, either by
enacting Religious Freedom Restoration Acts (RFRAs) or by interpret-
ing state constitutions to subject neutral and generally applicable
laws that burden religious exercise to heightened judicial scrutiny—
usually, but not universally, under the compelling interest test.8
Much of this new state law remains little used and untested.  RFRAs
have recently become politically toxic, largely as a result of both sides
in the culture wars misrepresenting what these laws do,9 but most of
them were passed with overwhelming bipartisan support.
3. See, e.g., BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? (2013); Micah Schwartzman,
What if Religion Is Not Special?, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1351 (2012).  For a response,
see Christopher C. Lund, Religion Is Special Enough, 103 VA. L. REV. (forthcom-
ing 2017).
4. Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty and the Culture Wars, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV.
839; Douglas Laycock, Sex, Atheism, and the Free Exercise of Religion, 88 U. DET.
MERCY L. REV. 407 (2011).
5. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
6. See, e.g., Frazee v. Ill. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989); Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
7. Smith, 494 U.S. at 876–90.
8. See Laycock, Culture Wars, supra note 4, at 844 & n.22, 845 & n.26 (collecting
citations). Arkansas and Indiana enacted Religious Freedom Restoration Acts
more recently. ARK. CODE §§ 16-123-401 to 16-123-407 (2015); IND. CODE §§ 34-
13-9-0.7 to 34-13-9-11 (2015). The thirty-third state only recently came to our
attention. See State v. Everly, 146 S.E.2d 705 (W. Va. 1966) (applying a standard
of review that is unclear, but clearly inconsistent with Smith).
9. See Douglas Laycock, The Campaign Against Religious Liberty, in THE RISE OF
CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 231, 248–50 (Micah Schwartzman et al., eds.
2015).
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Most recent religious liberty litigation in the Supreme Court has
been under the federal RFRA,10 which protects “any” exercise of relig-
ion11 but only against federal law,12 or under a similar statute, the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act,13 which pro-
tects prisoners and religious land use against state and local law.14
There are additional pockets of federal protection.  The Court has held
that the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses protect, and that
Smith does not apply to, a religious organization’s hiring and firing of
its religious leadership.15  This constitutional protection for the selec-
tion of religious leaders probably applies to all or most questions of
internal church governance.16
Congress and the states have enacted specific exemptions, protect-
ing particular religious practices from particular statutes, and a few of
these provide federal protection from state law.  So federal statutes
now protect Native American religious use of peyote,17 protect medical
providers from assisting with abortions,18 and protect churches from
state and federal claims to recover contributions made by members
who subsequently go bankrupt.19
But for all the remaining cases, Smith is the relevant federal law.
And Smith says that the Free Exercise Clause protects only against
laws that are not neutral, or not generally applicable. So what do
these concepts mean?  What makes a law neutral, generally applica-
ble, or not?
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4 (2012); see Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557
(2016) (vacating and remanding decisions holding that religious non-profit orga-
nizations were not entitled to have their secular insurers exempted from any obli-
gation to provide contraception); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct.
2751 (2014) (holding that closely held for-profit corporations and their owners are
protected from obligation to provide emergency contraception to their employees);
Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006)
(protecting religious use of hoasca, a tea containing small quantities of an halluci-
nogenic drug).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(4) (2012).
12. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2 (2012) (defining the governments subject to RFRA as
only the United States and its territories and possessions, the District of Colum-
bia, and Puerto Rico); see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (hold-
ing an earlier version of RFRA unconstitutional as applied to the states).
13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc–2000cc-5 (2012).
14. See Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015); Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709
(2005).
15. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694
(2012).
16. See Christopher C. Lund, Free Exercise Reconceived: The Logic and Limits of Ho-
sanna-Tabor, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1183 (2014).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 1996a (2012).
18. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 238n(a)(1) (2012).
19. Religious Liberty and Charitable Donation Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-183, 112 Stat. 517 (1998) (amending 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 546, 548, 707, 1325
(2012)).
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Smith involved a state prohibition on possession of peyote, an hal-
lucinogenic drug listed on Schedule I, which means it has no legal use.
The Court treated the ban on peyote as obviously neutral and gener-
ally applicable and said little about what it meant by those words.
But as we shall see, the little it did say is revealing.
The Court returned to the question three years later in Church of
the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah.20  Santeria is an Afro-
Caribbean religion that sacrifices small animals to its gods.  Hialeah
sought to ban the practice, without disrupting any of the myriad secu-
lar activities in which humans kill animals.  There were four ordi-
nances; one will give the flavor of them all.  It was illegal to kill an
animal unnecessarily, in a ritual or ceremony, not for the primary pur-
pose of food consumption.21  One indication of how the legal commu-
nity initially understood Smith is that the Eleventh Circuit
unanimously upheld these ordinances in a four-sentence, unpublished
order.22  The Supreme Court unanimously reversed, holding that the
ordinances were neither neutral nor generally applicable.23
It is now a quarter century since Smith and Lukumi.  The Court
has said nothing further about the meaning of neutral and generally
applicable law. Smith upheld the epitome of a generally applicable
law—what the Court called an “across-the-board criminal prohibition”
on possession of peyote.24 Lukumi struck down city ordinances gerry-
mandered to such an extreme degree that they applied to “Santeria
adherents but almost no others.”25
There is an impression in some circles that Smith states the broad
general rule, and Lukumi states a narrow exception.  But Smith and
Lukumi are both exceptional, with facts at opposite ends of the contin-
uum.  The law in Smith regulated religious use and every conceivable
secular use; there were no exceptions.  The ordinances in Lukumi reg-
ulated religion and nothing but religion.  The Court said explicitly
that laws do not have to be as bad as in Lukumi to be unconstitu-
tional: the “ordinances fall well below the minimum standard neces-
sary to protect First Amendment rights.”26
Many cases fall between the extremes of Smith and Lukumi.  Re-
ligious claimants challenge the application of laws that regulate relig-
ious conduct and some analogous secular conduct, but exempt other
20. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
21. Id. at 527.
22. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 936 F.2d 586 (11th Cir.
1991) (unpublished table decision).
23. Professor Laycock briefed and argued Lukumi in the Eleventh Circuit and in the
Supreme Court.
24. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990).
25. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 536.
26. Id. at 543.
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analogous secular conduct.  The lower courts have disagreed about
those cases, and the Supreme Court has remained silent.
Nebraska’s Richard Duncan has written about this issue repeat-
edly,27 and one of us has written about it repeatedly.28  We keep re-
turning to the issue because it is fundamental to constitutional
protection for religious liberty, and because what Justice Stevens
called the “crucible of litigation”29 continues to force new thinking and
reveal further implications of Smith and Lukumi.  We can state new
insights and state old insights more clearly.  The picture is not nearly
as bleak for religious liberty as it was in the three years between
Smith and Lukumi, when it was widely feared that the Court would
never enforce its new requirements of neutrality and general
applicability.
III. TWO REQUIREMENTS WITH DISTINCT CONTENT
A. Neutrality
In Smith, neutrality and general applicability mostly ran together.
But Lukumi addressed them as distinct requirements in separate sec-
tions of the opinion.  The ordinances were not neutral, because they
“target[ed]” Santeria, their “object” was to suppress Santeria sacrifice,
and they were “gerrymandered with care to proscribe religious killings
of animals but to exclude almost all secular killings.”30  These key
words—target, targeting, object, and gerrymander—are pervasive in
the neutrality section of the opinion.31  But none of them appears even
once in the section on general applicability.32
The neutrality section of the opinion also used the language of
equal protection and nondiscrimination law.  “At a minimum, the pro-
tections of the Free Exercise Clause pertain if the law at issue dis-
criminates against some or all religious beliefs or regulates or
prohibits conduct because it is undertaken for religious reasons.”33
These words—discriminate, discrimination, because—are also en-
27. Richard F. Duncan, Free Exercise and Individualized Exemptions: Herein of
Smith, Sherbert, Hogwarts, and Religious Liberty, 83 NEB. L. REV. 1178 (2005);
Richard F. Duncan, Free Exercise Is Dead, Long Live Free Exercise: Smith,
Lukumi and the General Applicability Requirement, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 850
(2001).
28. Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarships, The Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious
Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes but Missing the Liberty, 118 HARV. L. REV. 155,
200–18 (2004); Douglas Laycock, The Supreme Court and Religious Liberty, 40
CATH. LAW. 25, 25–38 (2000); Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise,
1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 41–54.
29. E.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52 (1985).
30. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 542.
31. Id. at 532–42.
32. Id. at 542–46.
33. Id. at 532 (emphases added).
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tirely absent from the general-applicability section of the opinion.
General applicability is a distinct requirement; it does not depend on
targeting, gerrymandering, discrimination, legislative motives, or the
object of laws.
“There are, of course, many ways of demonstrating that the object
or purpose of a law is the suppression of religion.”34  That is, there are
many ways of showing that a law is not neutral.  These ways largely
track discrimination law.  In that body of law, a plaintiff may prove
either a facial classification or that a facially neutral law is “a pur-
poseful device to discriminate.”35  A law that facially discriminates
against a protected class is usually accompanied by discriminatory
motive, but the law is discriminatory even without such a motive.
This is most clearly illustrated by the cases on sex discrimination in
retirement benefits.  Employers are prohibited from providing differ-
ent levels of retirement benefits to men and women even if their moti-
vation is based purely on life tables showing that women live longer on
average36 or even on the difficulty of finding an insurance company
that would sell a plan not based on such tables.37
Even when a challenged rule is facially neutral, those claiming dis-
crimination may show that the rule was adopted “at least in part ‘be-
cause of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an
identifiable group.”38  In Hunter v. Underwood, the Court unani-
mously held that a facially neutral provision of the Alabama Constitu-
tion was invalid because it had been “enacted with the intent of
disenfranchising blacks.”39  Courts are reluctant to find unconstitu-
tional motive, but this path is open to claimants where the proof is
sufficiently clear.
The Court did not invoke the law of free speech, but the rule re-
quiring compelling justification for content-based regulation of speech
has the same doctrinal structure.  A law is content-based and requires
compelling justification if it is content-based on its face or if it is
facially neutral but motivated by the speaker’s content.40  If the re-
striction on speech is content-based, the speaker “need adduce ‘no evi-
dence of improper censorial motive.’”41
34. Id. at 533.
35. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246 (1976).
36. See Ariz. Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred Compen. Plans
v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1079–85 (1983); City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435
U.S. 702, 707–11 (1978).
37. See Norris, 463 U.S. at 1085–91.
38. Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).
39. Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 228–29 (1985).
40. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2228 (2015).
41. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S.
105, 117 (1991) (quoting Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 228
(1987)).
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The Court in Lukumi said that its invocation of nondiscrimination
law is the “minimum” requirement of neutrality.42  Laws that burden
religion must at least not discriminate on their face and be free of
anti-religious motive.  Plaintiffs may prove as a path to strict scrutiny
that a law was enacted with anti-religious motive and thus is not neu-
tral. But they need not prove bad motive if the law discriminates on its
face or if the law is not generally applicable. Anti-religious motive is
sufficient to trigger strict scrutiny, but it is not necessary.43
We know that anti-religious motive is not necessary, because nine
Justices held the Lukumi ordinances unconstitutional while only two
found bad motive.  Justices Kennedy and Stevens reviewed the legis-
lative history of the ordinances and found anti-religious motive.44
Four justices dropped off the opinion at that point,45 and three said
that strict scrutiny should apply even to neutral and generally appli-
cable laws.46  Motive added little in Lukumi, where there were so
many other grounds for holding the ordinances not neutral and not
generally applicable.
Justice Kennedy’s discussion of legislative motive had only two
votes, but his discussion of the “object” of the ordinances had five.47
The “object” of an ordinance is a metaphorical construct; only the
humans who enacted an ordinance can have goals, purposes, or objec-
tives.  Andrew Koppelman plausibly views this talk of a law’s “object”
as an objective proxy for subjective motive—purpose inferred only
from the text of the law and the context in which it was enacted, not
including what lawmakers or advocates said about it.48  Alternatively,
the object or purpose of a law is simply what the law does, or what it is
intended to do, regardless of why legislators wanted to do those
things.  These two formulations differ in emphasis but not so much in
substance; either is read largely off the statutory text.
Something like one of these appears to be what the Court meant by
the “object” of the law in Lukumi, although neither the Court nor indi-
vidual justices have ever been clear about just what they mean. Jus-
tice Scalia’s shifting formulations were especially maddening.   He
42. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532
(1993).
43. Shrum v. City of Coweta, 449 F.3d 1132, 1144–45 (10th Cir. 2006) (collecting
cases).
44. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 540–42 (plurality opinion).
45. Id. at 558–59 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing for himself and Chief Justice Rehn-
quist that motive is irrelevant); id. at 522 (noting that Justices Thomas and
White did not join the motive section of the opinion).
46. Id. at 565–77 (Souter, J., concurring); id. at 577–80 (Blackmun, J., concurring for
himself and Justice O’Connor).
47. See id.
48. Andrew Koppelman, Romer v. Evans and Invidious Intent, 6 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 89, 107 (1997).
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said that constitutionality depends “on the object of the laws at issue”
and not on “the subjective motivation of the lawmakers.”49  He also
said that “the First Amendment does not refer to the purposes for
which legislators enact laws,” apparently using “purposes” as a syno-
nym for subjective motivations, “but to the effects of the laws en-
acted.”50  But of course in Smith, he expressly rejected an effects test:
“generally applicable, religion-neutral laws that have the effect of bur-
dening a particular religious practice need not be justified by a com-
pelling governmental interest.”51
This fuzzy talk of statutory “objects” identified largely from statu-
tory text fits the analogy to discrimination law that the Court invoked
and the analogy to the similar structure in free speech law.  It is not
enough that the law burdens a religious practice, but it is enough that
the laws treats that practice unequally as compared to analogous sec-
ular conduct.  If the law treats analogous religious and secular con-
duct in objectively unequal ways, the law is not neutral, and at least
one of its purposes or objects is to discriminate.
Concluding that a law is not neutral does not require a finding of
improper motive, but it may require an improper object.  Or it may
not: this inquiry into the ordinances’ “object” addresses only “the mini-
mum” requirement of neutrality.”52  It does not exhaust the neutrality
requirement, and it is no part of the general-applicability
requirement.
B. General Applicability
So what does general applicability add to neutrality?  “Generally
applicable law” would be an extremely odd way of describing a re-
quirement that government not act with bad motive or not act with an
improper purpose or object.  It would be an equally odd way of describ-
ing a rule that government cannot single out religion for uniquely ad-
verse treatment.  A law that applies to religion and one secular analog
is not generally applicable.  In ordinary English, a generally applica-
ble law is one that applies to everybody, in all similar situations—or
at least to nearly everybody and nearly all similar situations.  “Gener-
ally” allows for some exceptions in ordinary usage, but it does not al-
low for many.  The question is what exceptions it allows for in free
exercise cases under Smith and Lukumi.
The Court perceived the “across-the-board criminal prohibition” in
Smith as clearly generally applicable,53 so it had little occasion to ex-
plain what it meant by that requirement.  But Smith’s understanding
49. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 558 (Scalia, J., concurring).
50. Id.
51. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886 n.3 (1990).
52. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 533.
53. Smith, 494 U.S. at 884.
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appears from the Court’s analysis of its earlier cases on unemploy-
ment compensation: Sherbert v. Verner54 and Thomas v. Review
Board.55 Sherbert and Thomas applied compelling-interest review to
unemployment-compensation statutes that denied benefits to claim-
ants who refused work that conflicted with their religious obligations.
Smith reaffirmed these precedents.  It said that strict scrutiny ap-
plied because the unemployment-compensation law allowed individu-
als to receive benefits if they refused work for “good cause,” thus
creating “individualized exemptions” from the requirement of ac-
cepting available work.56  Where the state allows individual exemp-
tions, “it may not refuse to extend that system to cases of ‘religious
hardship’ without compelling reason.”57
Individualized exemptions are one way in which a law can fail to
be generally applicable.  The statute at issue in Sherbert was not gen-
erally applicable, the Court said in Smith, because it allowed “at least
some” exceptions.58  There cannot be many acceptable reasons for re-
fusing work and claiming a government check instead, but there were
“at least some,” and therefore, the state also had to recognize religious
exceptions.
This explanation for reaffirming Sherbert plainly implies a strin-
gent understanding of general applicability.  Even limited exceptions
can make a law less than generally applicable, triggering strict scru-
tiny.  There was discrimination between religious and secular reasons
for refusing employment, but that discrimination was quite narrow.
Religious reasons were unacceptable, but the vast majority of secular
reasons were also unacceptable.  What mattered was that some secu-
lar reasons were accepted, and religious reasons were not.  “The Free
Exercise Clause ‘protect[s] religious observers against unequal treat-
ment,’”59 regardless of targeting, motive, or an improper object.
IV. ELABORATING GENERAL APPLICABILITY
The Court elaborated the new standard in Lukumi, striking down
Hialeah’s ban on animal sacrifice.  The lack of general applicability in
Lukumi was shown in multiple ways: narrow prohibitions of selected
conduct as well as categorical and individualized exemptions for anal-
54. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
55. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
56. Smith, 494 U.S. at 884 (quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986) (plurality
opinion)).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 542
(1993) (quoting Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136, 148
(1987) (Stevens, J., concurring) (alteration by the Court)).
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ogous secular conduct,60 resulting in failure “to prohibit nonreligious
conduct” that endangered the city’s interests “in a similar or greater
degree than Santeria sacrifice.”61  The ordinances in Lukumi were far
from generally applicable.  But the Court’s analysis lays out an ap-
proach that also applies in closer cases.
If we require that analogous religious and secular conduct be
treated equally, then we have to decide what secular conduct is analo-
gous.  The Court was quite clear on what makes religious and secular
conduct analogous: that the “nonreligious conduct . . . endangers these
[state] interests in a similar or greater degree” as the burdened relig-
ious conduct.62  We must look to the reasons the state offers for regu-
lating religious conduct and then ask whether it permits secular
conduct that causes the same or similar harms.  Governments have to
offer these reasons in order to argue that the challenged law serves a
compelling government interest.  They may occasionally argue only
that the law is neutral and generally applicable, or that religious exer-
cise is not burdened, and not say what interests the law serves, but
such cases will be rare.  Quite apart from the doctrinal relevance of
the government’s interests, and whether or not those interests are
plausibly compelling, government litigants try to motivate courts by
elaborating the important interests that the challenged law allegedly
serves.
The secular conduct may be quite similar to the prohibited relig-
ious conduct, as in killing animals for religious and secular reasons.
Or the conduct itself may be substantially different; it is still analo-
gous if it harms or undermines the same or similar government inter-
ests.  So in Lukumi, one thinly substantiated reason the city offered
for prohibiting sacrifice was that the carcasses of sacrificed animals
threatened public health.  But a county health official testified that
garbage from restaurants was a greater health hazard than sacrificed
animals, and the Court treated restaurants, or at least disposal of res-
taurant garbage, as analogous secular conduct.63
So how much analogous secular conduct can be left unregulated
before a law ceases to be generally applicable?  Are some exceptions
more acceptable, or more troublesome, than others?  There is a circuit
split on such questions.  We will use the most extreme decision on the
unprotective side of the split to illustrate some of the arguments.
60. Id. at 543–44.
61. Id. at 543.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 544–45.  The testimony is quoted in Petitioners’ Brief at 41–42, Lukumi,
508 U.S. 520 (No. 91-948), 1992 WL 541280.
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A. Arguments for Minimizing the Requirement of General
Applicability: Stormans v. Wiesman
The most extreme decision attempting to minimize or effectively
eliminate any requirement that laws burdening religion be generally
applicable is Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman in the Ninth Circuit.64
Stormans was a free-exercise challenge to a rule that requires consci-
entiously objecting pharmacists to stock and deliver emergency con-
traception.  These pharmacists believe that emergency contraception
sometimes causes very early abortions.65  The state stipulated, and
the evidence confirmed, that there is no problem of access to emer-
gency contraception in Washington when pharmacists do not dispense
it and refer patients elsewhere.66  No other state even has such a
rule.67  So there was clearly no compelling government interest at
stake.  But that mattered only if strict scrutiny applied.  Lack of any
compelling interest is irrelevant if the rule is generally applicable.  It
is not.
More than 6,000 prescription drugs are approved for human use,
and no pharmacy can stock them all.68  The district court found that
regulators had long deferred to pharmacies’ discretion in deciding
what drugs to stock and that no pharmacy in Washington had ever
been cited for failure to stock a drug.69  Detailed findings of fact iden-
tified a wide range of accepted reasons for not stocking drugs.70  Phar-
macies that failed to stock emergency contraception overwhelmingly
made that decision for business reasons, not for reasons of con-
science.71  On the district court’s view of the regulations, none of these
business decisions were illegal. Only the failure to stock a drug for
reasons of conscience was forbidden.72  On the district court’s view,
the facts of Stormans are as extreme as the facts of Lukumi.73
The Ninth Circuit rejected the district court’s finding of a vast ex-
panse of unwritten exceptions.74  It agreed that pharmacies refused to
64. Stormans, Inc. v. Weisman, 794 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct.
2433 (2016).
65. Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 854 F. Supp. 2d 925, 932 (W.D. Wash. 2012), rev’d on
other grounds sub nom. Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 794 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir.
2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2433 (2016).
66. Id. at 944, 946–51.
67. Id. at 935.
68. Id. at 933.
69. Id. at 934.
70. Id. at 933–34, 943–44, 952–56, 970–75.
71. Id. at 947.
72. Id. at 939, 943, 945, 956.
73. Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1188, 1191 (W.D. Wash. 2012),
rev’d sub nom. Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 794 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 2015), cert.
denied, 136 S. Ct. 2433 (2016).
74. Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 794 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct.
2433 (2016).
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stock or deliver drugs for a vast array of secular reasons, and it agreed
that the Pharmacy Commission had never interfered with these prac-
tices.75  But it credited testimony that such practices might violate the
rules and that the Commission might investigate such practices and
decide what to do about them if anyone ever filed a complaint.76  It did
not acknowledge that the trial court had found the limited testimony
to that effect not credible in light of much contrary testimony, the text
of the rules, and the unbroken history of non-enforcement against bus-
iness reasons for failing to stock or deliver drugs both before and after
adoption of the new rules.77  The court of appeals focused only on ex-
plicit, written exceptions and held them reasonable.
The written rules contain an exception for prescriptions that are
erroneous, medically contraindicated, or incompatible with other
drugs the patient is taking.78  They have an exception for fraudulent
prescriptions.79  Neither of these exceptions undermines the state’s in-
terest in prompt delivery of appropriate medications, and the plain-
tiffs did not claim that they made the rule less than generally
applicable.  There is an exception for state or national emergencies in
which a prescribed drug is unavailable.80  The emergency undermines
the state’s interest, but the exception simply bows to reality; it does
not authorize any behavior by the pharmacy that undermines the
state’s interest, and plaintiffs did not rely on this exception either.
Then there is an exception for “lack of specialized equipment or
expertise,”81 which is broadly interpreted and is often a matter of the
pharmacy deciding for business reasons not to buy certain equipment
or provide certain services.82  There is an exception for customers who
do not pay,83 which sounds reasonable enough, but which often results
from the pharmacy’s discretionary decision not to accept Medicare,
Medicaid, or the customer’s private insurance plan.84
Most significant, pharmacies do not have to deliver a drug if it is
not in stock “despite good faith compliance with [the ‘Stocking
Rule’].”85  The Stocking Rule requires pharmacies to “maintain at all
times a representative assortment of drugs in order to meet the phar-
75. Id. at 1080–81.
76. Id. at 1081.
77. Stormans, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 957–59.
78. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 246-869-010(1)(a) (2016).
79. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 246-869-010(1)(d) (2016).
80. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 246-869-010(1)(b) (2016).
81. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 246-869-010(1)(c) (2016).
82. Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 854 F. Supp. 2d 925, 957–58, 970, 972 (W.D. Wash.
2012), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 794 F.3d 1064
(9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2433 (2016).
83. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 246-869-010(2) (2016).
84. Stormans, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 959, 972–73.
85. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 246-869-010(1)(e) (2016).
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maceutical needs of its patients.”86  “[R]epresentative assortment” is
not defined or explained, but “representative” clearly implies a reason-
able sample of drugs, not every drug.  The Stocking Rule has been in
effect for forty years, and as already mentioned, no pharmacy has ever
been charged with violating it.87  The state makes no effort to enforce
it.88  Given the looseness of the Stocking Rule, it is not actually writ-
ten down that failure to stock or deliver for reasons of conscience is
prohibited.  This prohibition was also left to unwritten understand-
ings.  But everyone understood that prohibiting conscience-based re-
fusals to stock or deliver drugs was the whole point of an elaborate
rule-making process, and not even the Ninth Circuit disputed it.
Finally, there is a catch-all exception for “substantially similar
circumstances.”89
So the vast array of accepted business reasons for not delivering a
drug were not entirely unwritten.  They could be found in the loose-
ness and nonenforcement of the Stocking Rule, in the written rule
that a pharmacy that doesn’t stock a drug doesn’t have to deliver it,
and in the provision for “substantially similar circumstances.”  But
the Ninth Circuit focused only on the explicitly written exceptions,
narrowly construed.
It concluded that “the enumerated exemptions are ‘necessary rea-
sons for failing to fill a prescription’ in that they allow pharmacies to
operate in the normal course of business.”90  And therefore, these ex-
ceptions for business reasons do not detract from the general applica-
bility of the rules.91  Because these business reasons were acceptable,
the state was free to decide that religious reasons were not acceptable.
Business reasons good; religious reasons bad.
The Supreme Court denied certiorari.92  As Justices of all ideologi-
cal perspectives remind us from time to time, a denial of certiorari
implies no view of the merits.93  The vagueness of the written rules
and reliance on unwritten understandings were part of the substan-
tive problem in Stormans, but they may also have created doubts
about what questions were really presented in this pre-enforcement
86. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 246-869-150 (2016).
87. Stormans, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 934, 954.
88. Id. at 934, 959–60.
89. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 246-869-010(1) (2016).
90. Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 794 F.3d 1064, 1080 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136
S. Ct. 2433 (2016).
91. Id.
92. Stormans v. Wiesman, 136 S. Ct. 2433 (2016).
93. See, e.g., Redd v. Chapell, 135 S. Ct. 712, 713 (2014) (statement of Sotomayor &
Breyer, JJ., respecting denial of certiorari); Martin v. Blessing, 134 S. Ct. 402,
405 (2013) (statement of Alito, J., respecting denial of certiorari); Boumediene v.
Bush, 549 U.S. 1328, 1329 (2007) (statement of Stevens & Kennedy, JJ., respect-
ing denial of certiorari).
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challenge. In addition to these and other common non-merits reasons
for which the Court may deny certiorari, a less common possibility
seems apparent in Stormans: perhaps the Court did not want to de-
cide a fundamental question about the meaning of the Free Exercise
Clause without nine Justices sitting. Whatever the reasons, the denial
of certiorari in Stormans leaves a deep and wide circuit split that the
Court will eventually have to resolve. This article addresses the mer-
its of the issue on which the circuits are split.
B. Reasonable Exceptions
The Ninth Circuit held that reasonable or justified exceptions do
not undermine a law’s general applicability.  This reasoning is pre-
cisely the preference for secular reasons over religious reasons that
Smith and Lukumi prohibit. Smith said that systems of individual
exemptions must include religious exemptions.94  That requirement
does not turn on whether secular reasons are “better” than religious
ones; that is a judgment that government is generally not permitted to
make.
In Sherbert v. Verner, the narrow exemption for “good cause”95 was
a perfectly sensible exemption to the general requirement of accepting
available work.  But this narrow and justified secular exemption still
required a corresponding religious exemption—or a compelling reason
why not.  It was not the bad policy of the secular exemption that man-
dated a religious exemption; it was the secular exemption’s mere exis-
tence.  Similarly in Lukumi, the city argued that its permitted secular
reasons for killing animals were “important,” “obviously justified,” and
“ma[de] sense.”96  But that did not make the ordinances generally ap-
plicable.  Secular exceptions defeat general applicability no matter
how important, justified, or sensible.
The Ninth Circuit also said that the state’s exemptions for busi-
ness reasons were “necessary.”97  This reasoning of course assumes
that religious reasons are unnecessary—even if the religious practice
is absolutely necessary to the believer.  For the court to conclude that
a religious practice is unnecessary requires a conclusion that the un-
derlying religious teaching is false.  That would be akin to a heresy
trial, and it is clearly off limits to the court.
The Ninth Circuit’s argument from necessity flouts a specific hold-
ing in Lukumi.  Three of the ordinances prohibited only unnecessary
killings.98  The city argued that nearly all secular killings were neces-
94. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990).
95. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 400–01 (1963).
96. Church of the Lukumi  Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 544
(1993).
97. Stormans, 794 F.3d at 1080.
98. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 525–28.
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sary but that religious killings were unnecessary.  But the Court re-
jected this necessity standard: “[T]he ordinance’s test of necessity
devalues religious reasons for killing by judging them to be of lesser
import than nonreligious reasons.”99  Neither courts nor states can de-
cide that business reasons are necessary but that religious reasons are
not.
There may be cases where an unusual secular reason for acting is
so important that the government has a compelling interest in treat-
ing that secular act more favorably than analogous religious acts.  At
the oral argument in Lukumi, one of us told Justice Scalia that “sav-
ing human life by killing an animal in self defense is a compelling
interest.”100  And such a compelling interest could justify discriminat-
ing between self-defense killings and religious killings.  But that lim-
ited consideration of the reasons for secular exceptions goes at the end
of the case, subject to strict scrutiny under the compelling-interest
test.  That is very different from comparing reasons at the beginning
of the case under a much more deferential standard of review—which
appeared in Stormans to be only rational basis—and holding that a
rule riddled with exceptions is really generally applicable if there ap-
pear to be plausible reasons for the secular exceptions.
C. Circular Categories and Circular Government Interests
Every law applies to everything it applies to.  And opponents of
religious liberty often argue that a law is generally applicable for just
this circular reason—it is a generally applicable prohibition of
whatever it prohibits.  In Lukumi, the city argued that it had enacted
a generally applicable ban on sacrifice, and that other animal killings
were “different.”101  The Ninth Circuit indulged similar reasoning in
Stormans, concluding at one point that “the rules’ delivery require-
ment applies to all objections to delivery that do not fall within an
exemption.”102  The court’s italicized “all” is entirely circular.
The circularity can also be introduced in the specification of the
relevant government interests.  At one point, the Ninth Circuit speci-
fied the state’s interest as preventing “the potential deleterious effect
on public health that would result from allowing pharmacists to refuse
to dispense lawfully prescribed medications based on personal, moral
objections (of which religious objections are a subset).”103  This formu-
lation of the state’s interest tries to put the rabbit in the hat.  The
99. Id. at 537–38.
100. Transcript of Oral Argument, Lukumi, 508 U.S. 520 (No. 91-948), 1992 WL
687913, at *22.
101. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 544.
102. Stormans, 794 F.3d at 1077.
103. Id. at 1079 (quoting Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1133 (9th Cir.
2009)).
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state cannot define its interests in terms of religion any more than it
can write its laws in terms of religion.  If your pharmacy will not de-
liver a drug because of some business reason, you are just as inconve-
nienced as when it will not deliver a drug because of conscientious
objection.  The state has to identify a real difference in the harm, not
just a difference in the source of the harm.
Nor does it make a law generally applicable to classify religious
conscience with secular conscience.  A law that applies only to religion
plus one tiny secular application, little different from religion and ar-
guably just a variant of religion, is not generally applicable.  This par-
ticular secular application was an empty set in Stormans; despite
considerable attention to the issue at trial, the state could not identify
any pharmacy in Washington that refuses to provide emergency con-
traception on grounds of secular conscience.  The argument is reminis-
cent of the city’s argument in Lukumi that its ordinances would also
apply to voodoo and that voodoo did not qualify as a religion104—an
argument the Court found unworthy of response.
D. Secular Exceptions Not Stated in the Law’s Text
Unequal treatment of religious and secular conduct requires strict
scrutiny, whether or not that inequality is reflected in the text of the
challenged law. Lukumi expressly rejected the city’s contention that
judicial “inquiry must end with the text of the law at issue.”105  In
addition to evaluating the text of the city’s ordinances, the Court re-
viewed an array of other sources to find analogous secular conduct left
unregulated.  These included numerous and wide-ranging sections of
Florida statutes,106 a tourist guide that described fishing in Hi-
aleah,107 and the testimony already mentioned about garbage from
restaurants.108
If only the text of the challenged law counts, then legislators or
regulators can use language that seems generally applicable, while as-
suring favored interests that they are not the target and that the rule
will never be enforced against them.  The drafting history of the phar-
macy regulations in Washington clearly and repeatedly stated that
the Pharmacy Commission had no intention of interfering with the
many business reasons for not stocking drugs.109  The industry trade
104. Brief of Respondent at 15, Lukumi, 508 U.S. 520 (No. 91-948), 1992 WL 541282.
105. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 534.
106. Id. at 526, 537, 539, 544–45.
107. Id. at 543.
108. Id. at 544–45.
109. Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 854 F. Supp. 2d 925, 936–46 (W.D. Wash. 2012), rev’d
on other grounds sub nom. Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 794 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir.
2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2433 (2016).
18 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:1
group withdrew its objections based on that assurance.110  But the
Ninth Circuit refused to consider the drafting history because “the col-
lective will of the [Commission] cannot be known, except as it is ex-
pressed in the text and associated notes and comments of the final
rules.”111
Only two Justices in Lukumi looked at legislative history for evi-
dence of bad motive.  We have no square holding on whether a major-
ity would look at legislative history for the quite different purpose of
determining the meaning and reach of the challenged law.  But the
Court in Lukumi did look at other things beyond the text of the chal-
lenged ordinances.  And if it will not look to the legislative history for
help to determine the reach of a challenged law, then the door is wide
open to laws that use uncodified understandings to regulate religion
and to exempt analogous secular conduct.  This is especially true for
administrative agencies, where the body that drafts the regulation is
also the body that enforces it.
Moreover, identifying these secular exemptions is rarely an all-or-
nothing choice between written and unwritten.  Washington’s exemp-
tion of all business reasons for not stocking and delivering drugs
partly depends on unwritten understandings, but not entirely so.
There was enough flexibility in the regulations’ text to reassure the
industry trade group.  Courts could consider these written escape
hatches together with the drafting history.
The district court also relied on the enforcement history.  The
Stocking Rule had never been enforced, and the new rules had not
been enforced against anyone except the lead plaintiff in the four
years between their promulgation and the trial.112  This was not legis-
lative history; enforcement history was a matter of official action and
it reflected the “collective will” of the Pharmacy Commission.
But the Ninth Circuit said it was irrelevant that the rules had
never been enforced against anyone but the lead plaintiff, because the
Pharmacy Commission followed a policy of “complaint-driven enforce-
ment.”113  There had been “many complaints” against the lead plain-
tiff, and hardly any complaints against anyone else.114  There were
hardly any complaints because being referred to another nearby phar-
macy is rarely a problem worth complaining about.  There had been
many complaints against the lead plaintiff because there had been an
organized campaign against that plaintiff by ideologically motivated
110. Id. at 941.
111. Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 794 F.3d 1064, 1078 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136
S. Ct. 2433 (2016) (alteration by the court) (quoting Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky,
586 F.3d 1109, 1133 (9th Cir. 2009)).
112. Stormans, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 956–57.
113. Stormans, 794 F.3d at 1083–84.
114. Id. at 1083.
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activists.115  A complaint-driven enforcement policy validates such a
campaign; it gives governmental effect to private hostility to the free
exercise of religion.
If governments can write vague rules that leave accepted under-
standings unstated, or that leave much to the discretion of enforce-
ment authorities or activists among the public, and courts then ignore
both the extratextual understandings and the actual and intended ex-
ercise of discretion, government is completely free to treat religious
and secular practices unequally.  The Free Exercise Clause would pro-
tect only against unsophisticated governments that explicitly state
what they are doing and make no effort to conceal it.
E. Rules That Apply to Most but Not All Analogous Secular
Conduct
Once we have identified the analogous secular conduct, both regu-
lated and unregulated, how much of it can be left unregulated before
the law is no longer generally applicable?  Many laws apply to some
but not all analogous secular conduct.  If the exempted secular con-
duct undermines the state’s interest to the same degree as the bur-
dened religious conduct, such a law is not generally applicable.  That
is what the Court said in Lukumi,116 and there are several illuminat-
ing examples in the lower courts.
One of our favorite examples is Rader v. Johnston,117 which arose
at the University of Nebraska-Kearney.  All the lawyers in the case
were graduates of the University of Nebraska’s law school, and the
plaintiff’s lawyer was very young when he won this case.  Rader chal-
lenged the University’s requirement that freshmen live in the
dorm.118  He wanted permission to live in a Christian group house in-
stead to avoid the alcohol, drugs, and premarital sex he said were
prevalent in the dorms.119  The university denied permission.120
The rule contained categorical exemptions for students older than
nineteen, married students, and students living with their parents.121
These categorical exemptions were entirely reasonable, but they
treated students’ secular needs more favorably than Rader’s religious
needs.  An explicit exception for individual hardship created entirely
reasonable individualized exceptions that were generously interpreted
115. See Stormans, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 948, 950–51, 960–61.
116. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 543
(1993).
117. 924 F. Supp. 1540 (D. Neb. 1996).
118. Id. at 1543.
119. Id. at 1544–46.
120. Id. at 1548.
121. Id. at 1546.
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in secular cases,122 but not in Rader’s case. There were additional in-
dividualized exceptions in unwritten administrative practice.123
When all the exceptions were accounted for, 64% of freshmen were
actually required to live in the dorm.124 That’s a large majority, but
the court held the rule not generally applicable. It said that “excep-
tions are granted for a variety of non-religious reasons, [but] they are
not granted for religious reasons.”125
There are other decisions to similar effect.  The Third Circuit held
that a permit fee for keeping wild animals, with exceptions for zoos,
circuses, hardship, and extraordinary circumstances, was not gener-
ally applicable.126  The Sixth Circuit considered a rule that penalized
a counseling student for referring to another counselor a client seek-
ing help with his same-sex relationship difficulties.  The court held the
rule not neutral and not generally applicable, because referrals were
permitted for other values conflicts and for failure to pay.127  In a case
about an acting student who refused to say certain religiously prohib-
ited words and phrases in a script, the Tenth Circuit held that a single
exception given to a student of another faith to observe a religious hol-
iday, and earlier religious exceptions given to the plaintiff, suggested
that defendant maintained a system of individualized exceptions.  And
that precluded summary judgment.128
An Iowa county ordinance prohibited vehicles with metal tires and
any kind of protuberance, which banned the tractors used by a com-
munity of Old Order Mennonites.129  But there was a year-round ex-
ception for school buses and fire trucks, a five-months-per-year
exception for studded snow tires, and an exception for tire chains
when there was actually snow or ice.130  All these permitted metal
protuberances went on rubber tires, not metal tires.  So the exempted
conduct was not identical to the prohibited religious conduct, but it did
the same kind of damage to the roads.  The Supreme Court of Iowa
unanimously held that the ordinance was not generally applicable.131
A Virginia court held that a ban on possession of certain bird feath-
ers was not neutral where it contained exceptions for taxidermists,
academics, researchers, museums, and educational institutions.132
And a federal district court held that a landmarking ordinance was
122. Id. at 1546–47.
123. Id. at 1547.
124. Id. at 1555.
125. Id. at 1553.
126. Blackhawk v. Pennsylvania, 381 F.3d 202, 206–12 (3d Cir. 2004).
127. Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 738–40 (6th Cir. 2012).
128. Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1297–99 (10th Cir. 2004).
129. Mitchell County v. Zimmerman, 810 N.W.2d 1, 4–5 (Iowa 2012).
130. Id. at 15.
131. Id. at 15–16.
132. Horen v. Commonwealth, 479 S.E.2d 553, 556–57 (Va. Ct. App. 1997).
2016] 2016 ROSCOE POUND LECTURE 21
subject to strict scrutiny where it had exceptions for substantial bene-
fit to the city, financial hardship to the owner, and the best interests of
the community.133
These are all cases where the challenged law or rule applied to
most people, or to a substantial range of secular conduct, but had ex-
ceptions that undermined the state’s asserted interests.  These are all
cases where government preferred some set of secular interests over a
similarly situated religious interest—where the government permit-
ted an otherwise prohibited activity for what it considered to be good
reasons, but did not believe that religion was a good reason.  These are
the cases that fall in between the facts of Smith and Lukumi. Smith’s
treatment of a law with “at least some exceptions,” and Lukumi’s test
of whether the state’s asserted interests are endangered clearly imply
the solution to these cases.  And all these courts held the challenged
law or rule not neutral or not generally applicable—usually the latter.
The Ninth Circuit opinion in the pharmacy case is the principal
exception.
F. Laws with a Single Secular Exception That Undermines
the State’s Interests
Sometimes the challenged law has only one secular exception.  But
a single secular exception also triggers strict scrutiny if it undermines
the state interest allegedly served by regulating religious conduct.
This is the holding of a well-reasoned opinion by then-Judge Alito,
writing for the Third Circuit in Fraternal Order of Police v. City of
Newark.134
The plaintiffs in Newark were two Muslim police officers whose re-
ligious beliefs required them to grow beards.  They challenged a city
policy requiring officers to be clean-shaven.  It was touted as a “zero
tolerance” policy, but it had two exemptions—one for officers with
medical conditions, and one for officers working undercover.  The un-
dercover exemption did not trigger strict scrutiny, because it did not
undermine the department’s interest in a uniform public appearance.
That interest obviously did not apply to undercover officers;135 uni-
form appearance would have wholly defeated the purpose of having
undercover officers.  But the medical exemption made the rule not
generally applicable, because it undermined the city’s interest in uni-
formity in the same way as would a religious exemption.136
The Eleventh Circuit reached a similar result in Midrash
Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside,137 which applied compelling-inter-
133. Keeler v. Mayor of Cumberland, 940 F. Supp. 879, 885–86 (D. Md. 1996).
134. 170 F.3d 359 (3d Cir. 1999).
135. Id. at 366.
136. Id. at 364–66.
137. 366 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2004).
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est review to the exclusion of religious assemblies from the business
district.  The stated goal of the zoning ordinance was to create “retail
synergy” in the business district.138  A single exemption for lodges and
private clubs “violates the principles of neutrality and general applica-
bility because private clubs and lodges endanger Surfside’s interest in
retail synergy as much or more than churches and synagogues.”139
The unemployment-compensation cases can also be viewed in this
light: a single exception for “good cause” required strict scrutiny of the
state’s failure to provide a religious exception. Newark and Midrash
Sephardi each involved a single categorical exception; the unemploy-
ment cases involved a single provision for individualized exceptions.
Either kind of exception—even if there is only one, if that lone secular
exception undermines the state’s asserted interests—results in une-
qual treatment of persons who need a religious exception.
Employment Division v. Smith is consistent as well, even though
Oregon allowed possession of a “controlled substance” pursuant to a
doctor’s prescription.140  “Controlled substance” covers a wide range of
drugs, and Oregon told the Court that the exception did not apply to
Schedule I drugs, including peyote.141  This is presumably why the
Court described the prohibition as “across-the-board.”142  The case
was about peyote, there were no secular exceptions, and the Court
treated the point as obvious.
The Court had not yet formulated the standard of whether secular
exceptions undermined the state’s interest, and the parties had had no
warning that the case would turn on neutrality and general applica-
bility, so there was no evidence in the record that would have let the
Court consider whether medical use under a physician’s supervision
would have undermined the state’s interests to the same extent as re-
ligious use under the supervision of a religious leader, the peyotero.  If
the Court thought about that question at all in 1990, it probably as-
sumed that physicians were more reliable and that a medical excep-
tion would not undermine the state’s interest.  But the essential point
is that there was no medical exception for peyote.
Smith was a case with no secular exceptions; Newark, Midrash
Sephardi, and Sherbert v. Verner, which all went the other way, were
cases with only one.  The question is not whether one or a few secular
analogs are regulated.  The question is whether a single secular ana-
log is not regulated.  The constitutional right to free exercise of relig-
ion is a right to be treated like the most favored analogous secular
138. Id. at 1234–35.
139. Id. at 1235.
140. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990).
141. Brief for Petitioners at 14 & n.6, Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (No. 88-1213), 1989 WL
1126846.
142. Smith, 494 U.S. at 884.
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conduct.  It is not enough to treat a constitutional right like the least
favored, most heavily regulated secular conduct.
V. UNDERLYING REASONS
These rules are not arbitrary.  They are deeply rooted in the under-
lying rationales of the general-applicability requirement.
A. Value Judgments about Religion
The Newark opinion reasoned that the medical exception “indi-
cates that the Department has made a value judgment that secular
(i.e., medical) motivations for wearing a beard are important enough
to overcome its general interest in uniformity but that religious moti-
vations are not.”143  The Eleventh Circuit adopted this reasoning in
Midrash Sephardi.144  This point about value judgments also appears
in Lukumi, which said that the ordinances’ necessity test “devalues
religious reasons for killing by judging them to be of lesser import
than nonreligious reasons.”145
The point deserves further elaboration.  It does not require that the
state make an explicit value judgment, or that state officials con-
sciously compare religious and secular conduct and deem the secular
conduct more worthy—although governments often do just that.  In a
typical case, the value judgment first emerges from a series of sepa-
rate comparisons.  In Newark, the exemption for medical needs
showed that the city considered medical needs more important than
its interest in uniformity.  And the refusal to exempt religious obliga-
tions showed that the city considered its interest in uniformity more
important than its officers’ religious obligations.  The transitive law
applies; if medicine is more important than uniformity, and uniform-
ity is more important than religion, then medicine is more important
than religion.  Whether explicit or implicit, that is the value judgment
that the Free Exercise Clause prohibits.
James Oleske has argued that with respect to secular exceptions
for categories of conduct, this reasoning requires that the request for a
religious exception be considered simultaneously with the adoption of
the secular exceptions.146  Otherwise, he claims, there is no value
judgment about religion.  But that is plainly not right.  There are sep-
arate value judgments against a common standard.  The rule maker
compares a proposed secular exception to the need for an exception-
143. Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359, 366 (1999).
144. Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1235 (11th Cir. 2004).
145. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 537
(1993).
146. James M. Oleske, Jr., Lukumi at Twenty: A Legacy of Uncertainty for Religious
Liberty and Animal Welfare Law, 19 ANIMAL  L. 295, 327, 338 (2013).
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free law.  Either earlier or simultaneously or later, it compares the
proposed religious exception to the need for an exception-free law.  It
concludes that the secular need is important enough or sympathetic
enough to deserve an exception and that the religious need is not.
The rule maker may make these two decisions separately even if
they are more or less simultaneous; it may or may not consciously
compare the proposed religious exception to the secular exception.
And there may be such a conscious comparison even if the two deci-
sions are separated in time; the rule maker may consider the rule and
all its existing exceptions in deciding to refuse the religious exception.
It may be impossible to know what the rule maker consciously thought
about, but we know the rule maker found a religious exception unde-
serving, and secular exceptions deserving, when measured against the
same alleged government interests.
Oleske would not require simultaneous decisions in cases of indi-
vidualized exceptions.147  But categorical exceptions are no different,
except that they affect a lot more people.  The decision maker adminis-
tering a system of individualized exceptions may or may not con-
sciously compare the religious request he refuses to secular exceptions
he has granted or is granting.  But all requests are judged in light of
the same alleged government interests; some secular requests are
found deserving, and the religious request is found undeserving.
Governments inevitably consider religious and secular exceptions
simultaneously when they defend the litigation.  The plaintiff de-
mands a religious exception and focuses attention on existing secular
exceptions.  If the body that made the rule is also making the litiga-
tion decisions, as with administrative agencies and city councils, it
could easily make the rules equal, either by granting the religious ex-
ception or repealing the secular exceptions.  With its attention focused
on the problem and considering all the exceptions simultaneously, it
refuses to do so.  Even where the executive-branch officials who con-
trol the litigation lack power to amend the challenged law, as with
statutes enacted by the legislature, the executive could settle the case.
The executive is subject to the Free Exercise Clause as well as to the
law that creates secular exceptions but fails to create religious excep-
tions.  If the executive chooses to litigate rather than settle, it rejects
any religious exception despite its simultaneous attention to the secu-
lar exceptions.  Simultaneity should not matter, but it is always
present.
B. Vicarious Political Protection for Religious Minorities
The requirement of generally applicable law also provides vicari-
ous political protection for religious minorities.  It is an application of
147. Id. at 342.
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Justice Jackson’s much quoted observation that “there is no more ef-
fective practical guaranty against arbitrary and unreasonable govern-
ment than to require that the principles of law which officials would
impose upon a minority must be imposed generally.”148  This idea also
appears in Lukumi.  Regulation that “ ‘society is prepared to impose
upon [religious groups] but not upon itself’” is the “precise evil the
requirement of general applicability is designed to prevent.”149
Small religious minorities will rarely have the political clout to de-
feat a burdensome law or regulation.  But if that regulation also bur-
dens other, more powerful interests, there will be stronger opposition
and the regulation is less likely to be enacted.
Even narrow secular exceptions rapidly undermine this vicarious
political protection. If secular interest groups burdened by the regula-
tion get themselves exempted, they have no reason to oppose the regu-
lation, and religious minorities are left standing alone.  That is plainly
what happened in Washington: the groups seeking to suppress consci-
entiously objecting pharmacies were careful at every stage not to
threaten any other pharmacy’s secular reasons for failing to stock and
deliver drugs.  With its secular interests protected, the industry trade
association abandoned its defense of the few pharmacies with objec-
tions based on conscience.150  This concern with vicarious political
protection is the deepest rationale for the rule that even a single secu-
lar exception, if it undermines the asserted reasons for the law, makes
a law not generally applicable.  A single secular exception can remove
the most—or only—politically effective opposition to a burdensome
rule.
Professor Oleske also objects to this rationale, on the curious
ground that it provides only partial and somewhat random protection
for religious liberty.151  Some religious practices will have secular
analogs engaged in by interest groups that provide this vicarious polit-
ical protection; some will not.  That is true, and that is a problem with
Smith and Lukumi however they are interpreted.152  But it is not a
reason to make the problem worse with an unprotective interpretation
148. Ry. Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
149. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 545–46 (quoting Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 542
(1989) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
150. Compare Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 854 F. Supp. 2d 925, 937 (W.D. Wash. 2012)
(finding that industry initially supported right to refer customers elsewhere for
reasons of conscience), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Stormans, Inc. v. Wies-
man, 794 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2433 (2016), with id.
at 941 (finding that industry accepted “compromise” in which referrals for busi-
ness reasons were permitted but referrals for reasons of conscience were not).
151. Oleske, supra note 146, at 329–30.
152. Christopher C. Lund, A Matter of Constitutional Luck: The General Applicability
Requirement in Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 627
(2003).
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of Smith and Lukumi.  And the randomness does not flow from read-
ing Smith and Lukumi more protectively.
Sometimes there are analogous secular interests that will be af-
fected by a rule that burdens religion, and sometimes there are not.
That is the source of any randomness, and that is not what Oleske
objects to.  To eliminate that source of randomness would require
overruling Smith and returning to Sherbert and Yoder.
When analogous secular interests are affected, sometimes those in-
terests will kill the proposed law, thereby protecting the religious
practice—a random source of protection that Oleske cannot change
and thus necessarily accepts.  And sometimes those analogous secular
interests will get themselves exempted and withdraw, leaving the re-
ligious practice to its fate.  How we treat this last set of cases neither
increases nor decreases the degree of randomness, but it is critical to
whether we provide a reasonable level of protection for religious
liberty.
C. The Level of Protection
We said that the requirements of traditional discrimination law
goes to neutrality, and that general applicability is a separate require-
ment.  Some readers may think that this general-applicability require-
ment provides a higher level of protection.  In a sense it does, and that
is entirely appropriate.  First Amendment rights are fundamental and
deserving of the highest level of protection.  But there is another way
to think about it.  A stringently interpreted general-applicability rule
can be understood as implementing a nondiscrimination requirement
in the face of complexity.
These cases differ from routine discrimination cases in the com-
plexity and number of possible secular comparisons.  Complexity gives
rise to arguments about whether the secular activity is really analo-
gous.  And multiple secular analogs to the burdened religious exercise
create the potential for some secular analogs to be regulated and some
to be exempted.
Racial comparisons are often simpler, although there can certainly
be arguments about whether an employee of a different race was simi-
larly situated with the plaintiff.  And as with secular analogs to relig-
ious practices, there is more than one race in the workforce.  If an
African-American plaintiff shows that he was treated worse than sim-
ilarly situated white employees, we would never let the employer de-
fend on the ground that Asian or Hispanic employees were treated
just as badly as the plaintiff.  Minority employees are entitled to be
treated as well as the best-treated race, not merely as well as some
other badly treated race.  It is no different to say that the exercise of
religion is entitled to be treated like the best-treated secular analog.
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When the law regulates the religious practice and exempts the
analogous secular practice, we have a facial classification—even if we
have to look at two different statutes to uncover it.  An initial failure
to exempt the religious practice may result from simple ignorance that
any such religious practice exists.  But persistence in that refusal af-
ter the issue is presented nearly always results from hostile indiffer-
ence to the needs of religious Americans, and often from more active
hostility.  Improper motive or purpose often accompanies unequal
treatment of religious and secular conduct, but that is not required.
When government regulates the exercise of religion and exempts some
or all analogous secular conduct, it is discriminating against religion.
Because of the number and complexity of the necessary comparisons,
this discrimination is best addressed by rigorously interpreting and
enforcing the requirement of generally applicable laws.  And a careful
reading of Smith and Lukumi supports that understanding.
VI. CONCLUSION
Of course there will be hard cases, and cases close to the line.
Some secular exceptions will serve compelling interests, and some will
not undermine the same interest as the needed religious exception.
But we should not casually assume that because secular exceptions
are common, legislators are free to create them without also protect-
ing the free exercise of religion.  The free exercise of religion is a fun-
damental constitutional right; the many secular interests pushed by
lobbyists seeking exceptions generally are not.
The Ninth Circuit’s reading in Stormans would effectively repeal
the Free Exercise Clause.  If those regulations are generally applica-
ble, anything can be drafted to be generally applicable. But Smith and
Lukumi promise much more protection than that.
Protection for religious liberty under Smith and Lukumi is incom-
plete; some laws really are generally applicable.  And it is compli-
cated; the threshold issue of general applicability adds complexity to
every case.  But many laws have exceptions that undermine the inter-
ests the laws are meant to serve.  And in that wide range of cases,
there is still constitutional protection for the free exercise of religion.
And protecting religious liberty, just like protecting other constitu-
tional rights, is a good thing.
